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ABSTRACT 
These days, most data is digitized and processed in various ways by computers. In the past, computer 
owners were free to process data as desired and to observe the inputted data as well as the interim 
results. However, the unrestricted processing of data and accessing of interim results even by 
computer users is associated with an increasing number of adverse events. These adverse events often 
occur when sensitive data such as personal or confidential business information must be handled by 
two or more parties, such as in the case of e-Discovery, used in legal proceedings, or epidemiologic 
studies. To solve this problem, providers encrypt data, and the owner of the computer performs 
decoding in the memory for encrypted data. The computer owner can be limited to performing only 
certain processing of data and to observing only the final results. As an implementation that uses 
existing technology to realize this solution, the processing of data contained in a smart card was 
considered, but such an implementation would not be practical due to issues related to computer 
capacity and processing speed. Accordingly, the authors present the concept of PC-based High Grade 
Anti-Tamper Equipment (HiGATE), which allows data to be handled without revealing the data 
content to administrators or users. To verify this concept, an e-Discovery application on a prototype 
was executed and the results are reported here. 
Keyword: Anti-Tamper, e-Discovery, Bitlocker, APIHook 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
These days, most data is digitized and processed in various ways by computers. In the past, computer 
owners were permitted to process data as desired and to observe the inputted data and the interim 
results. However, the unrestricted processing of data and accessing of interim results even by 
computer users is associated with an increasing number of adverse events. These adverse events often 
occur when sensitive data such as personal or confidential business information must be handled by 
two or more parties, such as in the following cases. 
(1) Epidemiologic studies: Epidemiologic studies often seek to compare data concerning (a) 
physical loads, such as the exposure dosage of individuals at a workplace and (b) the incidence of 
illnesses, such as cancer, obtained from hospitals and field studies for investigating correlations 
with various factors. However, when this data is transferred to a partner or third party and the 
usual processing is performed, personal information contained in the inputted data or interim 
results may be revealed to the person using the computer to perform the data processing. This is a 
problematic situation from the standpoint of protecting personal information. Consequently, at 
present, the exchange of this data is not possible, thereby creating a problem in that epidemiologic 
studies cannot be used to improve the health of citizens. As a current solution, (i) data encrypted 
by the original owner may be transferred to a partner or third party, and (ii) the partner or third 
party may input the encrypted data into a computer, which after the data is decrypted, implements 
certain processing and outputs only correlation values, so that the interim results and other 
sensitive information are not accessible to even the computer user.   
(2) e-Discovery: Japanese companies are often involved in e-Discovery performed for US civil 
court. Prior to preceding to trial in a US civil court in both Japanese and US civil courts the 
defendant and the plaintiff sides mutually disclose electronic evidence. At this time, if electronic 
documentary evidence containing a keyword or other security mechanism by the plaintiff side 
exists but is not disclosed, the trial will be severely disadvantaged. Conversely, if all accumulated 
electronic data is disclosed unconditionally, personal information may be revealed and critical 
business information may be leaked unnecessarily to a rival plaintiff. For this reason, electronic 
documents may be partially sanitized [4]. The plaintiff side receiving the sanitized electronic 
documents may want to verify with a computer that the sanitized portions do not contain 
keywords, but if viewing the sanitized portions is freely permitted, the defendant-side secrets 
would be revealed unfairly. To resolve these problems, computer processing may also determine 
whether the sanitized portions contain keywords, but other processing such as deciphering the 
sanitized portions should not be performed, and the interim results should not be revealed. 
Common to the solutions of these problems is that the computer owner performs only specific 
processing of the data and is able to observe only the final results. One conceivable means to realize 
such a solution is to use tamper-resistant equipment that prevents the owner from changing the 
processing or accessing interim results. Smart cards (also known as IC cards) are typically used as the 
tamper-resistant equipment. A smart card contains a secret key that is not revealed, even to the user, 
and public key encryption, which is generally used to implement digital signatures.  
Smart cards, however, have the problems of slow processing speed, small memory, and are difficult 
for an average person to program using an ordinary computer language. Thus, we developed a system 
that overcomes these problems by improving the PC hardware and software. This new system, 
configured from PC-based hardware and from software such as the boot control function (BCF) [11] 
previously developed by the authors, is known as High Grade Anti-Tamper Equipment (HiGATE). 
This paper presents the HiGATE concept, and reports the results of the application of a prototype to e-
Discovery.  
With the heightened interest in the handling of personal and confidential information, the range of 
applications for HiGATE is expected to increase in the future. 
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To achieve the same objective, the use of an encryption protocol has also been envisioned, but such an 
approach would only be suitable for an extremely narrow range of applications and could not be 
applied to the types of problems encountered here. Approaches similar to that used in our research, 
that is, preventing even a computer user from freely processing data and accessing interim results, 
have not been reported in other studies.  
 
2 OVERVIEW OF PROPOSED SYSTEM 
 
2.1 HiGATE Requirements 
 HiGATE has the following five requirements. 
1. A tamper-resistant area exists that even the owner cannot access. 
2. A memory with sufficient capacity for calculations is provided 
3. Arithmetic computations are processed at a fast speed. 
4. Programming by a trusted third-party, rather than the owner, is permitted. 
5. The equipment is easy to realization. 
A smart card is an example of a device capable of satisfying the first requirement above. The use of a 
smart card, however, has the following two problems. First of all, the processing capacity presents a 
problem, especially in cases such as e-Discovery, where large quantities of data are handled and 
processing must be done within a limited timeframe. Secondly, programming a smart card requires the 
use of special techniques such as micro-programming, and an ordinary person would not be able to 
program a smart card as desired. Thus, the development of HiGATE, which satisfies the above five 
requirements, was needed for applications not suitable for smart cards. 
2.2 Measures for Satisfying the Requirements 
(Requirement 1) 
The HiGATE functions necessary to satisfy requirement 1 are listed below:  
① Hardware function 
Capability to prove that the equipment case has not been opened 
② Software functions 
1. Boot control function for application programs 
2. Encryption function for entire hard disk (HDD) 
3. Arithmetic processing function 
4. File delete function that leaves intact the inputted data for calculations and the interim results.  
These functions are described in detail in Section 3. 
(Requirements 2, 3, 4 and 5) 
Requirements 2, 3, 4 and 5 can be implemented automatically through the process of PC-based 
development. In other words, PC-based development provides the advantages of fast I/O throughput 
and computational speeds, the capability to accumulate large quantities of data, and the ability to use a 
common programming language such as C or JAVA instead of a special programming language. 
Moreover, PC-based development facilitates installation since there is no significant need for special 
equipment. In this case, Windows, with which the authors have much experience, was chosen as the 
OS. 
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3. HIGATE CONFIGURATION 
3.1 Prerequisites 
(Prerequisite 1) The BIOS and OS are running properly. 
(Prerequisite 2) Unauthorized actions are not performed when implementing the HiGATE settings. 
(Prerequisite 3) HiGATE does not contain an unauthorized program. 
HiGATE operates under the abovementioned conditions. 
3.2 Possible Unauthorized Actions 
There are three conceivable methods for attacking HiGATE, and these are listed below: 
(Unauthorized action 1) Forcible opening of the case and extraction of information from the 
memory 
(Unauthorized action 2) Removal of the HiGATE HDD and connection to another PC to extract 
the HiGATE internal data and programs, etc. 
(Unauthorized action 3) Activation of an unauthorized program to modify other programs or steal 
information. 
3.3 Functions to Protect Against Unauthorized Actions 
(Protection 1) Provide proof that the case has not been opened. 
As in the description of unauthorized action 1, it is conceivable that the case can be opened and the 
memory contents stolen. Accordingly, it is important to prevent the case from being opened. This 
protection may be realized by the following two methods. 
(1) Cause the power supply or other essential device to shut off and the memory contents to 
disappear if the case is forcibly opened. Methods for switching off the power supply include: (a) 
microswitch-based detection of the case opening, (b) detection via a lead switch and a magnet on 
the case cover, and (c) optical detection of the lid opening.  
(2) Provide a seal that clearly indicates whether the case has been opened. Tamper-resistant labels 
are an existing technology. If a tamper-resistant label is peeled off, an indication that the case has 
been opened remains. By making the data contained in the HiGATE lose its effectiveness when a 
seal is cut and peeled off, unauthorized actions by the user can be prevented.  
Here, we decided to use method (2), which is easily achieved. In the future, a combination of methods 
(1) and (2) will enable enhanced safety. 
(Protection 2) HDD encryption 
HDD encryption is implemented to prevent the HDD used in the HiGATE from being removed or 
connected to another PC and to prevent the HDD contents from being modified or extracted as 
described in unauthorized action 2. An existing technology is the BitLocker function which is 
provided only in Windows Vista Enterprise and Windows Vista Ultimate editions. Because Windows 
Vista Enterprise is only sold through volume licensing, we installed Windows Vista Ultimate as the 
HiGATE OS. 
(Protection 3) Boot control (BCF/Vista) 
As described in unauthorized action 3, it is conceivable that an unauthorized program can be activated 
to modify other programs and steal information. BCF/Vista [11] is an existing technology developed 
by the authors to prevent such unauthorized actions. The BCF/Vista function is described in detail in 
Section 3.4. 
Other functions include the file delete and arithmetic processing functions. The file delete function 
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deletes data from the HDD used with HiGATE. This function operates so that the HiGATE user does 
not leave behind any data after the usage of that data has been completed. The HiGATE system 
handles data which even the user is not permitted to view. Accordingly, the continuous retention of 
data in the user’s HiGATE system will lead to an unauthorized action. The arithmetic processing 
function is used in different ways depending on the application, and can be developed freely by the 
program developer. Additionally, unauthorized actions through the skillful use of the keyboard are 
conceivable, but can be avoided through the use of the device driver installation control function in 
Windows Vista Ultimate.   
3.4 BCF/Vista 
BCF/Vista was a part of the development of the Dig-Force [2][3] digital forensic system. 
BCF/Vista computes hash values for programs that are activated during setup, registers these hash 
values in a white list, and digitally signs the entire white list. The OS and then BCF/Vista are set to 
start next. After they are running, the BCF/Vista function computes hash values for application 
programs as they try to start up, and after confirming the validity of the previously registered white list 
by signature verification, the computed hash value is compared to the hash value in the white list. If 
the value is the same as the registered hash value, the program starts, but if not registered, APIHook is 
used to prevent the program from starting.  
As a result, even if an unauthorized program attempts to start up, if Prerequisite 1 that “the BIOS and 
OS are running properly,” has been established, the unauthorized program can be prevented from 
running. For further details regarding the BCF/Vista function, refer to reference document [11]. 
3.5 Functional Configuration 
Providing the hardware function and the four software functions listed in Section 2.2 enables a tamper-
resistant area to be realized to protect the OS and the arithmetic processing function residing on the 
HDD, as well as the keys, data, etc., residing in memory. Accordingly, an arithmetic processing 
program created by a program developer and placed in the tamper-resistant area can be executed 
correctly by the HiGATE system without any unauthorized actions. The HiGATE functional 
configuration is shown in Figure 1 and smart card and HiGATE functions are compared in Tables 1 
and 2. 
3
HiGATE structure
Application program
HiGATE basic program
Boot control 
function
(BCF/Vista)
HDD 
encryption 
function
OS(Windows Vista Ultimate)
White list
File delete 
function,
etc.
Hardware (PC‐based with added functions for responding  to 
attempted access of interior)
 
Figure 1.  HiGATE Block Diagram 
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Table1.  Differences between Smart Cards and HiGATE 
Difference IC Card HiGATE
OS EMV
specification
Windows 
Vista 
Ultimate
Limitation 
due to 
program 
language 
development 
Limited Not 
limited 
Memory RAM (1 
MByte)
RAM (3 
Gbytes)
 
Table 2.  Similarities between Smart Cards and HiGATE 
Similarity IC Card HiGATE
Startup of 
predetermin
ed program
Read-only 
semiconduct
or memory
BCF/Vista 
Memory 
cannot be 
accessed 
externally 
Encryption 
circuit or 
single-chip 
implementati
on of 
memory
Case cannot
be opened 
with tamper-
resistant 
label 
False 
environmen
t cannot be 
created 
Access 
controlled by 
CPU 
HDD 
encryption 
Tamper-
resistant 
area 
Access 
controlled by 
CPU 
・BCF/Vist
a 
・HDD 
encryption 
・Tamper 
-resistant 
label
 
4. HIGATE OPERATION 
This section describes the HiGATE operation: 
① HiGATE manufacturing phase 
② Program installation phase 
③ Setting phase 
④ Usage phase. 
Persons involved in the above four steps of HiGATE operation include the manufacturer, program 
creator, and user. 
① Manufacturing phase 
The manufacturer preinstalls the OS (Windows Vista) and BCF/Vista required for HiGATE in the 
HiGATE PC, and then transfers the HiGATE system to the program developer. 
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② Program installation phase 
The program developer receives the HiGATE system from the manufacturer, and loads the 
processing programs necessary for application into HiGATE. 
③ Setting phase 
After program installation, the HiGATE system and BCF/Vista are configured with the necessary 
settings. At this time, the program creator implements the settings with administrator privileges. 
(1) BIOS settings 
To prevent booting of an OS installed on the PC other than Windows Vista, “Set the BIOS 
password” and “Restrict bootable storage to the HDD” BIOS settings are implemented, and only 
the program creator knows the BIOS password.  
(2) User account settings 
So that the operator cannot operate Windows services and the task scheduler from the user account 
that is utilized when operating the PC, the user account is not given administrator privileges.  
 (3) Program installation 
Controller program files that comprise BCF/Vista, agent program files, and the white list files are 
installed. These files are stored on a drive encrypted by BitLocker (described below), and are set 
as read-only files that cannot be overwritten or deleted by the user account. 
 (4) BitLocker settings 
BitLocker is a drive encryption function of Windows Vista Ultimate. BitLocker is used to encrypt 
all the drives on an HDD so that an attacker is unable to remove the HDD from the PC and use 
another PC to modify the programs that comprise BCF/Vista.  
 (5) Windows service settings 
Nanshiki Corp.’s sexe freeware was used to register the controller as a Windows service. This 
service was registered under the name MonitoringController (hereafter referred to as MC Service). 
As a result, the controller starts up automatically after Windows Vista has started. With this 
setting, however, MC Service will not start if the user account is logged in while in safe mode. 
Therefore, MC Service information is added to the Windows registry so that MC Service will start 
even in safe mode. 
(6) Task scheduler settings 
The task scheduler is used so that startup occurs when an agent logs into the user account. 
After implementing these six settings, tamper-resistant labels are affixed to all HiGATE parts that 
could be opened.  
④ Usage phase 
 The user uses a HiGATE system which has been set up as above. At this time, a user account that 
does not have administrator privileges is used by the user.  
These are the phases of HiGATE operation. By allocating the above roles to the participants involved, 
the participants can be prevented from performing any unauthorized actions. HiGATE users do not 
possess administrative privileges, and therefore it would be difficult for them to perform an 
unauthorized action on the data. Moreover, since the program creator does not possess the HiGATE 
system, it would be nearly impossible for him or her to implement an unauthorized action on the data 
handled by the user. Accordingly, none of the participating individuals are able to perform an 
unauthorized action on the data used and handled by the HiGATE system. The prerequisite that the 
BCF/Vista administrator does not perform any unauthorized actions is made possible by this system. 
5. APPLICATION TO E-DISCOVERY 
In this section, the HiGATE system is applied to e-Discovery. The e-Discovery system described is 
the “e-Discovery System for Sanitizing Disclosure Information and for Securing Evidence” [1] 
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proposed by Takatsuka et al. 
5.1 e-Discovery 
The US Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) were amended in December 2006 so that in US civil 
litigation, corporations are obligated to disclose electronic evidence during the discovery phase held 
before the start of a civil trial. This disclosure of electronic evidence is known as e-Discovery 
[5][6][8]. Figure 2 shows the basic flow of the e-Discovery procedure.  
Plaintiff
Plaintiff’s
attorney
Defendant’s
attorney
Defendant
Forensic consulting company
Judge
Court
? Retaining 
counsel
? Litigation
? Retaining  
counsel
? Data collection 
(e‐mail, etc.)
? Keyword 
specification
? Data processing
? Data  
disclosure
? Data  verification
? Submission 
of evidence
Keywords are selected words 
that are highly  relevant to the case
E‐Discovery in narrow sense is underlined.  
Figure 2.  e-Discovery Procedure 
 
5.2 e-Discovery System Proposed by Takatsuka et al. 
First, the plaintiff side provides the defendant side with keywords which relate to the case. Then, using 
those keywords, the defendant side discloses files relating to the case. However, these files may 
include information such as company secrets that the company does not want to disclose. As a 
solution, electronic sanitizing technology [4] is used. The defendant side completely sanitizes 
documents that do not contain keywords, and partially sanitizes documents that contain both keywords 
and passages which the company does not want to disclose. This method permits the disclosure of 
only the minimum required data. With the present sanitization technology, however, a keyword may 
be contained in an area to be sanitized, and verification thereof is nearly impossible. Takatsuka et al. 
solved this problem by encrypting the data contained in a sanitized area. Data that has been subjected 
to sanitization with encryption is disclosed to the plaintiff side. The plaintiff side accepts and verifies 
the data. At that time, the plaintiff side verifies that keywords are not contained in sanitized areas.  
With this process, however, the decrypted results of sanitized locations may be unfairly observable. 
Therefore, a tamper-resistant security device is used so that interim results cannot be observed, and the 
HiGATE system is used for this purpose. Here, a HiGATE system that includes the program part 
developed for e-Discovery is referred to as HiGATE/e-Discovery. 
We developed the minimum needed programs for HiGATE/e-Discovery. The languages used are C# 
and C++, and constitute a total of approximately 3,000 steps.  
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5.3 HiGATE/e-Discovery Operation 
This section describes the operation when HiGATE is applied to e-Discovery. HiGATE is used as a 
security device at the application site. Application of the HiGATE system solves the problems of data 
interference by the plaintiff side and the slow processing speed associated with smart cards.  
1. HiGATE/e-Discovery manufacturing and program loading 
The manufacturer transfers the HiGATE system to the program developer. The program 
developer loads e-Discovery software into the HiGATE system. The e-Discovery software 
program has five functions for digitally verifying keyword files, decrypting sanitized 
passages, verifying whether keywords exist in a decrypted passage, verifying evidence, 
and extracting files relating to the case. 
2. HiGATE/e-Discovery settings 
The HiGATE settings were described in Section 4. e-Discovery keywords are also 
delivered and the plaintiff and defendant sides exchange public keys.  
3. HiGATE/e-Discovery usage 
The plaintiff side inputs the data received from the defendant side into 
HiGATE/Discovery, and runs the program. This enables the plaintiff side to verify that 
keywords are not contained in the sanitized areas. Next, the plaintiff side reviews only the 
data related to the case, and moves ahead with the litigation. 
Based on these considerations, the applicability of HiGATE to e-Discovery appears promising. 
6. CONCLUSION 
This paper has proposed hardware that is equipped with a tamper-resistant function that cannot be 
modified by even the hardware owner, has fast I/O throughput and arithmetic processing speeds; is 
capable of accumulating large quantities of data that can be programmed similarly to a PC and can be 
developed inexpensively and easily. A prototype was built and the results of an application of e-
Discovery were reported.  
The basic HiGATE program developed this time has only minimal functionality, but we intend to 
expanded the functionality in the future, and improve the ease-of-use and safety. 
The HiGATE system is suitable for application to situations requiring technology for proving that an 
administrator has not accessed files or participated in the processing. In addition to e-Discovery, the 
application is thought to be possible in many other fields, such as data matching in an epidemiologic 
study. 
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